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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between EU agricultural subsidies and agricultural 
labour productivity growth by estimating a conditional convergence growth model. We use 
more representative subsidy indicators and a wider coverage (panel data from 213 EU regions 
over the period 2004-2014) than have been used before. We find that, on average, CAP 
subsidies increase agricultural labour productivity growth, but this aggregate effect hides 
important heterogeneity of effects of different types of subsidies.  The positive effect on 
productivity comes from decoupled subsidies, i.e. Pillar I decoupled payments and some Pillar 
II payments.  Coupled Pillar I subsidies have the opposite effect: they slow down productivity 
growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional economic theory and policy analysis posit that agricultural subsidies distort 
incentives and reduce productivity (Johnson, 1973; OECD, 2008).  However, theoretical and 
empirical studies have shown that this is not always the case.  Subsidies may enhance 
agricultural productivity in the presence of imperfections in credit or insurance markets (e.g. 
Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Hennessy, 1998; Roche and McQuinn, 2004).  A recent review 
concludes that some studies find positive, other negative effects, and some find no effect of 
subsidies on agricultural productivity (Minviel and Latruffe 2017).  These different findings 
may be due to variations in rural market imperfections, or to differences in the nature of the 
subsidies.  Different types of agricultural subsidies cause different distortions and may thus 
have different productivity impacts (e.g. Latruffe et al., 2009; Rizov et al., 2013).  These 
differential effects are important to understand for policy-makers when they consider reforms 
of agricultural policy to reduce market distortions or to make agricultural policies consistent 
with sustainability, resilience and climate change objectives.  
Our paper contributes to this literature by analysing the impact of the more than 50 
billion euros annual subsidies of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on agricultural 
productivity.  In comparison with previous studies, we (a) use more accurate and complete 
CAP subsidy data, (b) disaggregate subsidy payments into payments of specific subsidy 
instruments, (c) have a wider coverage of EU regions, including the new member states 
(NMS), and (d) cover a longer and more recent time period than has been used before.  
Specifically, we use the Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) dataset which includes all farm 
subsidies and details on the types of payments for all subsidy categories.  Our analysis uses a 
regional conditional convergence model and covers the 2004-2014 period and 213 regions of 
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the EU-27 (compared to previous studies that covered EU-15 only)
1
 allowing to better test for 
regional heterogeneity effects for subgroups of countries and for different subsidy types.  
Key results are that CAP subsidies, as a whole, have a positive impact on labour 
productivity in agriculture but that there are important differences in the impact of different 
types of subsidies.  The positive effect comes from decoupled subsidies, i.e. Pillar I decoupled 
payments and Pillar II payments. Coupled Pillar I subsidies have the opposite effect: they 
slow down productivity growth.   
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of the 
literature on subsidies and agricultural productivity. In Section 3 we discuss our empirical 
approach. In Section 4, we describe our dataset and variable construction. Results are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Subsidies and agricultural productivity: Related literature 
Improvements in agricultural labour productivity over time typically result from the 
movement of workers from farm to non-farm occupations, a process driven by relatively 
higher wages and productivity in urban jobs, accommodated by adoption of labour-saving 
techniques of production by farmers. This process is supported by investments in agricultural 
research, development and extension (see e.g. Gardner 2002).   Agricultural subsidies may 
affect this process.   
Agricultural subsidies can reduce agricultural productivity growth by causing 
allocative and technical efficiency losses: (i) farmer investment decisions may be distorted 
towards relatively less productive activities that are supported by subsidies (Alston and James, 
2002); (ii) farmers may over-invest in subsidised inputs (Rizov et al., 2013); (iii) subsidies 
                                                 
1
 Today there are 28 EU member states. The 15 “old” member states (OMS, also often referred to as “EU-15”) 
joined the EU before 2004; the 13 “new” member states (NMS) joined since 2004. More specifically, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004, 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Croatia, which joined the EU most recently in 2013, is not included as CATS 
data are not available for the period covered in our analysis.  
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may reduce a farmer’s incentive to adopt cost-optimising strategies (Leibenstein, 1966; 
Minviel and Latruffe, 2017); or (iv) subsidies may lead to soft budget constraints, causing 
inefficient use of resources (Kornai, 1986).  
However, some studies have argued that subsidies may also stimulate productivity 
growth under specific conditions, and that the nature of the subsidies may play a role. 
Theoretical arguments that subsidies may enhance agricultural productivity are based on the 
impact of subsidies on farm constraints due to rural market imperfections.  With (rural) capital 
market imperfections, subsidies may help overcome financial constraints of farmers (directly 
by boosting a farmer’s financial resources and indirectly by improving access to credit), 
which may enhance farm productivity (Blancard et al., 2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009).  
With imperfect insurance markets, subsidies may mitigate risk and trigger investment in 
certain types of activity which the farmer may otherwise consider too risky (Hennessy, 1998; 
Roche and McQuinn, 2004).  In both cases, productivity could increase with subsidies.  
Empirical evidence is also mixed.  Minviel and Latruffe (2017) review studies on the 
impact of subsidies on farms’ technical efficiency and conclude that some studies find 
positive, other negative effects, and some find no effect of subsidies on agricultural 
productivity.  This does not have to come as a surprise.  Given that the theoretical arguments 
of the potential positive effect of subsidies are based on market imperfections, one would 
expect these potential positive effects to be stronger when these market imperfections are 
more important, and vice versa.  Hence, one could imagine that the credit-enhancing effects of 
subsidies could be more important in cases such as when the new member states (NMS) 
joined the EU in the mid-2000s, as credit constraints were very important for farms in those 
regions in that period (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009).   
Another potential explanation for heterogeneous effects is the nature of the subsidies.  
Within the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (and in agricultural subsidy discussions 
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globally) a crucial differentiation is between “coupled” and “decoupled” subsidies.  Coupled 
subsidies have traditionally been identified as the main source of distortion in agricultural 
markets due to efficiency losses.  As they are tied to output, coupled support is likely to 
distort input and/or output allocation.  The effect of decoupled subsidies may be different as 
they do not directly affect farmers’ product choices, so are less likely to cause inefficiency 
(Dewbre et al., 2001; Guyomard et al., 2004; Rizov et al., 2013).  Empirical studies indeed 
find (a) negative correlations between coupled subsidies and various measures of productivity 
(Latruffe et al., 2009; Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010; Zhu et al., 2012; Mary, 2013) and (b) that 
agricultural productivity in the EU increased with the shift from “coupled” to “decoupled” 
subsidies (Mary, 2013; Rizov et al., 2013; Kazukauskas et al., 2014). However, there are 
counter examples. Indeed, Gardner (2005) working with a cross-section of countries in the 
period 1980-2001, showed that the level of agricultural support measured by the producer 
support estimate (PSE), was positively correlated with agricultural productivity growth, in a 
sample of about 27 countries, mainly OECD countries.
2
 
Other studies have also argued that there may be heterogeneous effects for different 
types of rural development subsidies (so-called Pillar II payments in the CAP).  First, the 
impact of less favoured areas (LFA) payments, granted to farms solely on the basis of their 
unfavourable geographic location, on agricultural productivity is ex ante not clear. On the one 
hand, LFA payments may keep inefficient farms going, thereby reducing efficiency (Latruffe 
and Desjeux, 2016). On the other hand, this type of payments may help maintain agricultural 
land in good condition by ensuring that agricultural land remains cultivated in areas with poor 
natural agricultural endowments, thereby enhancing efficiency (Knific and Bojnec, 2010; 
Latruffe and Desjeux, 2016). Moreover, Baráth, Fertő and Bojnec (2018) found no significant 
difference in the technical efficiency between LFA and non-LFA farms in Slovenia, but they 
                                                 
2
 Note, Gardner (2005) used PSE data averaged over the 1985-1989 period in his growth regression, hence a mix 
of the commodity price support policy and coupled farm income subsidies were covered. 
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did find differences in the use of production-environment-specific technologies (e.g., adoption 
of less intensive technologies in areas with low soil fertility). This means that LFA payments 
may improve efficiency by allowing farmers to adopt technologies that offset negative 
impacts of LFA conditions on productivity. 
Furthermore, Pillar II payments for investments in human and physical capital may be 
productivity enhancing and cost-reducing, as improved knowledge of efficient farming 
practices can lead to better use of technology and land (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015; 
Dudu and Kristkova, 2017).  Agri-environmental measures are generally assumed to have a 
negative effect on productivity as they impose constraints on input use (such as fertilizers, 
pesticides and land). However, empirical evidence on the productivity effect of agri-
environmental payments is mixed. Some find a negative effect on productivity (Lakner, 
2009), while others find no or a positive effect (Mary, 2003; Dudu and Kristkova, 2017).  
Finally, wider rural development payments may have no effect on farming itself, but support 
other sectors such as rural infrastructure and tourism. 
In summary, the impact of CAP payments on agricultural productivity is likely to 
differ by the geographic region and the type of subsidy considered.  The expected net impact 
depends on the relative size of the different sub-effects. 
 
3.   Empirical approach 
3.1  Theoretical model 
To analyse the impact of CAP on regional productivity growth patterns, we use a conditional 
𝛽-convergence equation in a dynamic panel data framework.  This approach follows, for 
7 
 
example, Rizov (2005)
3
 and other empirical studies that rely on the neoclassical growth model 
(Solow, 1956) and implement growth regressions which allow to include a larger set of 
explanatory variables and test for convergence (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
4
  
The method has been popularized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin's (1991) through the estimation 
of what they call β-convergence hypothesis,5 namely the idea of the Solow (1961) model 
according to which there should exist a negative relationship between the growth rate of 
productivity and the initial level of productivity.
6
  
According to neoclassical growth theory, there are two types of convergence (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995): absolute convergence and conditional convergence. The absolute 
convergence hypothesis assumes that, regardless of the initial conditions, in the long term the 
productivity growth in all economies (countries/regions) converges to the same steady state.  
The conditional convergence hypothesis contends that if economies have different structural 
characteristics and growth factors, then convergence is conditional on these parameters, 
giving rise to different steady states.
7
   
The use of a conditional  convergence model has a number of advantages. First, it has 
a stronger theoretical base for productivity growth assessments, drawing on the seminal 
contributions of Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956) and a variety of applications in growth 
                                                 
3
 Rizov (2005) uses an augmented neoclassical Solow growth model to analyse the impact of farm 
individualization in transition economies, so the variables of interest (and geographic focus) differ. 
4
 For a review of the convergence literature, see Islam (2003) and Snowdon and Vane (2005).  
5
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin's (1991) also introduced the notion of σ–convergence, which refers to decreasing 
cross-country dispersion in productivity, i.e. differences in productivity levels becoming smaller over time. 
Another approach is the time series approach, which is mostly based on stochastic approaches like cointegration 
(Gáspár, 2012). 
6
 Either cross-sectional and panel data models can be used to test β-convergence hypotheses (see Caselli et al. 
(1996) for a discussion). In the case of a dynamic panel framework, the negative relationship to test is between 
the actual growth in productivity, over a period of one to five years, and the initial productivity level, lagged one 
to five years, respectively.  
7
 Depending on whether absolute or conditional hypothesis is tested, there are two different types of β-
convergence. If the β-convergence model is regressed on the lagged values of the dependent variable alone, then 
it is an “absolute” β-convergence model. On the other hand, if the β-convergence model is regressed on other 
explanatory variables, to identity factors which could foster productivity to converge, it is a “conditional” β-
convergence model. An alternative type of conditional convergence is club-convergence, where convergence 
applies to only restricted groups of similar economies (Baumol, 1986; Galor, 1996).  
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models (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991)). Second, studies have provided empirical 
evidence in support of agricultural productivity convergence in the EU.
8
  However only a few 
studies have used the convergence growth model to study the impact of the CAP on 
agricultural productivity in the EU. These studies (Sassi, 2010; Montresor et al., 2011; 
Cuerva, 2012) used data for a restricted number of EU countries (EU-15) from at most two 
time periods (and thus used cross-sectional estimation methods) which did not cover the 
recent shift from coupled to decoupled subsidies.  Since our analysis uses a wider set of 
countries (EU-27), better subsidy indicators, and ten years of annual data, this allows to 
estimate a dynamic panel model by means of an appropriate generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator (Caselli et al., 1996; Bond et al., 2001) which is crucial to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic issues, and reverse causation in our key policy variable of 
interest, i.e. the CAP support rate.  
Finally, though our conditional convergence equation has its logical derivation from 
the neoclassical growth model, both applications of neoclassical and endogenous growth 
models can be appropriate for explaining convergence and non-convergence behaviour.  
Throughout the convergence debate, the neoclassical and the endogenous growth models have 
evolved and the boundaries between the explanation for convergence and non-convergence 
behaviour in both theories have faded (Islam, 2003). The empirical evidence does not 
unanimously favour either of these growth theories (Esposti, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
geographical setting of this study in the EU, where a single market is pursued, fits well with 
the key assumption of the neoclassical model that is based on the idea that technological 
progress, being exogenously given, is similar for all regions.   
 
                                                 
8
 A number of studies provided evidence for convergence in agricultural productivity in EU regions. These 
studies include Paci (1997), Alexiadis (2010), Sondermann (2014), and Baráth and Fertő (2017). Other studies 
focused on regional convergence within specific EU countries (e.g., Esposti (2010) for Italy) or made extra-EU 
comparisons (e.g., Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1999); Gutierrez (2000), Ball et al. (2001), and Rezitis (2010) 
compared the EU with the US).   
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3.2  Estimation strategy 
We estimate a conditional β-convergence analysis  using the following reduced form dynamic 
panel model: 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≡  𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 , denotes region i’s agricultural labour productivity growth 
between time t and t-1; 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged log agricultural value added (VA) per worker, i.e. 
the convergence term. Our variable of interest is the agricultural subsidy rate 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡−1. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a 
vector of control variables that may also affect labour productivity, such as the logarithm of 
the labour force growth (LF), the logarithm of the population density (PD) and additional 
regional expenditures of the EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).
9
  The subsidy 
variables as well as the other covariates enter the equation lagged by one year. This reflects 
the assumption that farmers need time to adjust to a new situation, e.g. a farmer’s choice to 
leave at time t is affected by the level of CAP payments at time t-1.  To control for potential 
endogeneity bias due to omitted variables, we include regional and time fixed effects, 𝜇𝑖 and 
𝛾𝑡 , respectively.  
Using standard OLS or fixed effects (FE) estimators, will generate biased estimates in 
the regression coefficients, because the lagged dependent value is correlated with the model’s 
error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (Nickell, 1981).  In AR(1) panel models, the OLS estimator is in general found 
to be biased upwards, while the fixed effects estimator is found to be biased downwards (see 
Bond et al., 2001).  
                                                 
9
 Most EU funding is delivered through the five ESIF: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion 
Fund (CF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)/ the former European Agricultural 
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), European Social Fund (ESF) and European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF). They are jointly managed by the European Commission and the EU countries. They are designed 
to invest in job creation and growth. Our ESIF variable covers all funds, except for the EAFRD – to avoid 
double counting with our CAP payment data - and the EMFF –for which data are unavailable.  
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The most widely used approach to account for unobserved individual country (region) 
effects and to deal with endogeneity of some regressors is applying estimation techniques 
based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). Particularly, we rely on the two-step system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s correction method for the 
variance-covariance matrix.
10
 The SYM-GMM estimator is an extension of the first 
generation of GMM models using transformations in first differences (DIFF-GMM).
11
   
 The estimated relationship between agricultural productivity growth and CAP payments 
could, to a certain extent, be affected by simultaneity bias, as CAP payments are not assigned 
randomly to farmers (or regions).  This issue is particularly relevant for coupled Pillar I 
payments.  Past productivity of farms and regions directly affects the allocation of coupled 
Pillar I payments.  The relationship between productivity and decoupled payments may also 
be subject to endogeneity.  The allocation of decoupled Pillar I payments is not directly linked 
to current regional production activities, but the allocation of these payments among member 
states is based on the average amount of coupled payments received during the reference 
period (2000-2002) preceding the introduction of the 2003 CAP reforms.
12
  This implies that 
regions that were more productive and/or produced more subsidized output in the past receive 
higher decoupled payments today (and in the period of our analysis).  
While this (potential) source of endogeneity bias is certainly something to be concerned 
about, there are a number of reasons why such bias, if present, is likely to be (very) small in 
                                                 
10
 Monte Carlo studies (e.g., Blundell and Bond, 1998) show that the two-step GMM estimator is asymptotically 
more efficient than the first step estimator but it may yield downward biased results in small samples. To deal 
with  this potential bias, Windmeijer (2005) proposes a finite sample correction for the variance-covariance 
matrix in the two-step GMM estimator. 
11
 DIFF-GMM has been proven to perform poorly in small T and large N panels (Bond et al., 2001). Since our 
dataset includes almost 1600 observations (i.e. large N) over a 10-year period (i.e. small T), we decided not to 
use this type of model. 
12
 This aspect is particularly relevant for the OMS that already received CAP support before the 2003 reforms. 
However, a similar argument holds for the decoupled support system in the NMS, i.e. the Single Area Payment 
Scheme (SAPS). The SAPS was not based on farm productivity directly, yet it was linked to the pre-accession 
average country/regional productivity in the NMS (Ciaian et al., 2015). 
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our empirical analysis.  First, since our estimation model uses as a dependent variable a year 
to year change in agricultural labour productivity in a recent period (2004-2014) and not 
productivity levels, it is not obvious that the relationship between this growth variable and 
differences in the allocation of current coupled/decoupled payments could be affected by 
potential endogeneity coming from past yield levels (of more than ten years earlier in the case 
of decoupled payments). In other words, this endogeneity bias would be a more serious issue 
if we would relate changes in the allocation of subsidy payments to productivity levels rather 
than to changes in productivity.  Second, as discussed in Olper et al. (2014) and Garrone et al. 
(2019), the assumption of the exogeneity of our (lagged) CAP subsidy rate variable, 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡−1, 
can be justified on the ground that CAP policy instruments (and their distribution among 
member states) are allocated by EU authorities rather than by regional authorities (Pillar I) or 
through negotiations between the EU and national authorities (Pillar II).
13
  Third, all the CAP 
subsidy variables are lagged by one year, which reduces the potential bias caused by a 
spurious correlation due to shocks simultaneously affecting CAP payments and agricultural 
output.  
Despite these arguments suggesting that the potential for endogeneity bias between 
agricultural labour productivity growth and the CAP subsidy rate is limited, we decided to 
apply a SYS-GMM model in order to rule out any residual component of endogeneity bias.  
CAP subsidy variables are treated as endogenous in this SYS-GMM model, using the t-2, t-3 
and longer lag levels (and differences) as instruments. The SYS-GMM model used in our 
analysis has the advantage to better control for simultaneity bias (Wintoki et al., 2012; Ullah 
et al., 2018) that might persist even after lagging explanatory variables (Bellemare et al., 
2017).  
 
                                                 
13
 More specifically, the CAP is financed by two funds: the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and 
the EAFRD, and up until financial year 2006 the EAGGF. 
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4.  Data and variables  
Our dataset covers 27 EU member states and 213 regions over the period 2004-2014.  The 
choice of the period of analysis (2004-2014) is due to data availability.  The (CATS) subsidy 
data were available only from 2004; and the agricultural productivity data coming from the 
Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (CERD) were available only until 2014. 
The data were aggregated based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
(NUTS)
14
 at NUTS2 level with the exception of Denmark, Germany, Slovenia, and the United 
Kingdom, for which NUTS1 level of aggregation was applied.
15
  We had to drop some 
regional observations due to the lack of data for some variables employed in our econometric 
analysis, and two strong outliers.
16
 This resulted in a final sample consisting of 1,587 
observations and 213 regions. 
 
4.1  Agricultural labour productivity growth (dependent variable)  
 We use CERD data to measure productivity growth in agriculture as annual growth in 
gross agricultural VA (VA-Agr.) per worker in real terms, where workers are defined as all 
persons engaged in some productive agricultural activity.
17
 Gross agricultural VA embodies 
the productivity effect induced by (coupled) CAP payments.  
                                                 
14
 The NUTS is a geographical nomenclature subdividing the economic territory of the EU into regions at three 
different levels: NUTS1, NUTS2, and NUTS3, respectively, moving from larger to smaller territorial units 
(Eurostat, 2013). 
15
 The choice of employing NUTS1 level data for Germany and the UK is based on the fact that these countries 
adopted a regional approach to the implementation of both CAP and structural fund policies at NUTS1 level. As 
for Denmark and Slovenia, the choice of employing NUTS1 level is due to the fact that agricultural subsidy data 
are not available at NUTS2 level for the entire period of analysis.   
16
 We dropped two observations based on a number of diagnostic tests. Partial-regression plots and the DFBETA 
test in STATA clearly identify the values of  CAP subsidies for the Border, Midland and Western region in 2013 
and the Bucharest region in 2010 as outliers. Our main results remain robust to the inclusion of these outliers. 
See Appendix A for the result after inclusion of these outliers. 
17
 Although labour productivity is a partial measure of productivity, this measure is still a main element of 
differences in the economic performance of regions and regional ‘competitiveness’ (Martin, 2001). 
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 The average rate of agricultural labour productivity growth is around 1.3% in the EU as 
a whole (see Table 1).  The growth rate in NMS (3.2%) is more than four times higher than in 
the OMS (0.8%).  These growth differences are consistent with a process of convergence in 
productivity level between NMS and OMS. 
 In order to avoid endogeneity bias, we need a measure of the growth in agricultural VA 
per worker that is net of the effect of coupled CAP subsidy payments, as this component of 
payments are included in the computation of agricultural VA (see European Commission, 
2000).  In principle, we can compute agricultural VA net of the effect of coupled payments by 
subtracting this CAP subsidy component from the agricultural VA. However, this approach 
implicitly assumes that the transfer efficiency of CAP payments is 100 percent, while studies 
have shown that the transfer efficiency is often lower, due for example to capitalization of 
CAP payments in land rents. Thus, following Olper et al. (2014) we measure agricultural 
labour productivity growth net of the effect of coupled CAP subsidies by first regressing the 
agricultural productivity growth (the dependent variable) on the coupled CAP subsidy 
component, and then keeping the residuals from that regression.  Note, in the observed period 
coupled CAP subsidy significantly decrease starting from 2005 onward, because as an effect 
of the Fischler Reform they are largely substituted by decoupled CAP subsidy. So that this 
adjustment in the productivity growth rate, is relevant only in the first two years of our data. 
Importantly, without this adjustment, all regression results of the paper are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar.  
 
4.2   Agricultural subsidy rate  
 The key variable in the regression equation, 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 , is the agricultural subsidy rate, 
which, as in previous analysis, is calculated as the ratio of agricultural subsidies over 
14 
 
agricultural VA at regional level.
18
 We compute the ratio between regional CAP payments 
and regional agricultural VA, because this ratio provides us with a consistent indicator of 
regional agricultural protection due to CAP policy measures.  
What is different in our study is that we calculate the regional CAP payments with 
data from the CATS database
19
 aggregated at NUTS2 regional level. The CATS database 
includes information on payments of each individual budget component of the CAP funds to 
all farms that receive payments.  To the best of our knowledge, only Dudu and Kristakova 
(2017) use CATS data in their analysis of the impact of CAP payments on agricultural 
productivity.  They only focus on the impact of CAP Pillar II payments over a short period of 
analysis.  
The CATS data include details on all payments made to all recipient farmers for each 
individual budget component of the CAP funds. Previous studies of EU agricultural 
productivity typically constructed subsidy indicators using the dataset of the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN), which covers only agricultural holdings whose size 
exceeds a minimum threshold. Using CATS data reduces the sample selection bias inherent to 
studies based on FADN data. Second, the CATS data allow to distinguish (a) between Pillar I 
and Pillar II payments; (b) within Pillar I support between decoupled and coupled payments; 
and (c) within Pillar II payments between five classes of payments (for which we follow the 
categorization of Boulanger and Philippidis (2015)).  This allows to test whether these various 
types of payments have different effects on agricultural productivity growth. Third, our 
analysis covers 213 regions of the EU-27 (as compared to previous studies that covered EU-
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 Other studies relating agricultural productivity (efficiency) to this subsidy rate are for example Fogarasi and 
Latruffe (2009) and Bakucs et al. (2010). See Minviel and Latruffe (2017) for an overview.  
19
 The CATS was created to assist the European Commission in implementing audits on agricultural 
expenditures. It collects the digitalized files that each member state forwards to the European Commission 
concerning details of all individual payments (in euro) made to CAP recipients.  
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15 regions).
20
  This allows to disentangle effects for subgroups of countries and, in particular, 
whether there are differences between old member states (OMS) and NMS.  Fourth, we use 
ten years of annual data starting from the year when the NMS acceded to the EU (2004-2014). 
The post-NMS accession period was not covered in previous studies.  
Of course, concerning the use of CATS data, we should also mention that by including 
farm activities related to smaller farms may entail a number of drawbacks, at least to the 
extent that activities of “hobby” farmers with substandard efficiency levels are concerned. 
However, a critical point of our econometric exercise that differentiates our paper from 
analyses conducted at the farm level, is the possibility to generalize our results for the full 
population of farmers. This is an important point because agricultural subsidies have both 
direct and indirect effects. Indirect effects operate mainly through the adjustment of factor 
markets and output prices (see, e.g. Pufhal and Weiss, 2009). Thus by working at the 
aggregated (regional) level and considering the true amount of money related to the different 
policy measures targeted at each territorial unit, we are able to fully capture the indirect 
effects of agricultural policy in our analysis.
21
    
To address potential endogeneity bias that might arise from having VA on both sides of 
our empirical model we lag the subsidy variables by one year and treat the CAP subsidy rate 
as endogenous in the applied SYS-GMM model.  
                                                 
20
 Today there are 28 EU member states. The 15 “old” member states (OMS, also often referred to as “EU-15”) 
joined the EU before 2004; the 13 “new” member states (NMS) joined since 2004. More specifically, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004, 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Croatia, which joined the EU most recently in 2013, is not included as CATS 
data are not available for the period covered in our analysis.  
21
 It is worth noting that by using CATS instead of FADN data to measure CAP subsidy rates, the differences in 
the level of support is substantial. For example, considering the overall CAP payments (Pillar I and PillarII), the 
average amount of agricultural support related to agricultural value added, is equal to 32% using CATS data, a 
value that goes up to 51% when using FADN data. This is a considerable difference that cannot be attributed to 
the inclusion of “hobby” farmers. Importantly, the difference between the two types of subsidy indicators (CATS 
vs. FADN), is not only cause by the difference in levels of subsidy payments, but also in differences in the 
growth rate over time. This problem is particularly important for the NMS (see Table 1 in Garrone et al. (2019)). 
This is at odds with an empirical framework that exploits within region variation in agricultural protection rates 
for identification. 
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4.3  Different types of agricultural subsidies  
The CATS database allows to disaggregate total CAP payments into several components to 
test whether the impact on agricultural employment differs among types of agricultural 
subsidies.  First, within Pillar I support we distinguish between coupled and decoupled 
payments.  Coupled payments are those linked to the production of a specific crop or animal 
commodities.  Over the last decade, reforms have generally moved the CAP away from 
coupled payments.  Most of the Pillar I payments are now decoupled from production.  The 
residual component of coupled subsidies, linked to production, represents a small fraction of 
the overall support.  
Second, within Pillar II payments we distinguish between five categories, following 
Boulanger and Philippidis (2015): (a) investment in human capital (HK); (b) investment in 
physical capital (PK); (c) agri-environmental payments (ENV); (d) LFA payments; and (e) 
wider rural development (RD) instruments.
22
   
 
4.4.  Control variables 
Control variables include changes in the agricultural labour force, population density, 
GDP growth, share of large farms, and share of grassland.  Data for these variables are 
obtained from the CERD and Eurostat.
23
  As is common in the growth literature, the growth 
of the agricultural labour force is calculated as the difference between the (log) labour force in 
year t minus the (log) labour force in year t-1, then adjusted by the common exogenous rate of 
                                                 
22
 The wider rural development measures include payment for diversification into non-agricultural activities, 
encouragement of rural tourism, and village renewal and development. 
23
 Data on agricultural labour force growth, population density, and regional GDP are obtained from CERD. 
Data on the share of large farms and the share of grassland are obtained from Eurostat. 
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technical change and the common depreciation rate, the sum of which is assumed to be 0.05 
(Mankiw et al., 1992).  
The growth rate of regional GDP is an indicator of regional economic conditions and 
development. The regional share of large farms and the ratio of grassland over the total 
utilized agricultural area are both indicators of farm structure and production structure. As 
Glauben et al (2006) we add population density, calculated as the total population over 
regional area in km
2
, as control indicator for market conditions, such as the level of activity in 
product and factor markets, with activities expected to more intense and imperfections lower 
in areas with higher population density. 
To control for other types of (non-agricultural) EU support to the region, we also 
include a variable covering ESIF spending.  We use annual EU expenditures of the ERDF, the 
CF, and the ESF at the NUTS2 level of regional aggregation per unit of regional GDP.
24
 
According to Esposti (2007) these expenditures can be considered as mostly consisting of 
investment. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that ESIF, on average, accounts for a 
larger share of regional GDP in NMS than in OMS. Few previous studies have controlled for 
these payments, but these payments could influence the results if they are correlated with 
CAP subsidies (due to omitted variable bias).  We later test the robustness of our results by 
running the models with and without this control variable.  
 
5.   Results  
Tables 2 to 4 report the estimation results for the EU-27 (Table 2), OMS (Table 3), and NMS 
(Table 4).  In each table, Column 1 presents SYS-GMM regression results with the total CAP 
subsidy rate as the main explanatory variable. Columns 2 to 4 present SYS-GMM regressions 
                                                 
24
 ESIF data come from the DG REGIO website https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/EU-Level/Historic-EU-
paymentsregionalised-and-modelled/tc55-7ysv. Regional GDP data come from the CERD.  
18 
 
results with CAP expenditures disaggregated into Pillar I and Pillar II (Column 2); and further 
into “coupled Pillar I subsidies” and “decoupled Pillar I subsidies” (Column 3) and the five 
components of Pillar II (Column 4).    
Column 5 presents results using OLS and Columns 6 using FE with total CAP 
subsidies – to compare with the SYS-GMM estimates in Column 1. The SYS-GMM (Column 
1) point estimates of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. the one year lagged agricultural VA 
per worker) fall within the range of the OLS (Columns 5) and FE (Column 6) point estimates, 
suggesting that the SYS-GMM estimator yields consistent estimates (Bond et al., 2001).   
Standard tests for consistency of the SYS-GMM estimators are reported at the bottom 
of Tables 2-4.  The Arellano-Bond tests AR(1) and AR(2) indicate the absence of first-order 
autocorrelation, indicating that the dynamic model is correctly specified.  The p-value of 
Hansen’s test suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the (joint) validity of our 
instruments at the 5% level of significance.
25
  
Key results on the impact of CAP subsidies on productivity are the following. The 
total CAP subsidy rate (Column 1) has a positive and significant coefficient for all three 
regional specifications (EU-27, OMS and NMS).  Hence, on average, CAP subsidies have a 
positive impact on EU agricultural productivity growth.  However, as the regressions in 
Columns 2-4 show, the different type of subsidies have very different effects.   
Total Pillar I subsidies have no significant positive effect on agricultural labour 
productivity growth in the EU-27, the OMS, or the NMS.  This aggregate result for Pillar I 
seems to be caused by the opposing effects of decoupled and coupled Pillar I subsidies. The 
                                                 
25
 The SYS-GMM estimator requires relatively mild stationarity assumptions. To be specific, the assumption of 
mean stationarity is required to ensure the consistency of the SYS-GMM estimator under large N and fixed T 
asymptotics (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Over-identifying restriction tests, such as the Hansen test (Bun and 
Sarafidis, 2015), can in principle be used to detect violations from mean stationarity. The literature suggests to 
combine such tests with difference over-identifying restrictions tests (Bun and Sarafidis, 2015). By computation 
of such differences between DIFF-GMM and SYS-GMM statistics, we detect no violations of the mean 
stationarity assumption. 
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estimated effect of decoupled Pillar I subsidies is positive and significant, while coupled Pillar 
I subsidies have the opposite effect: they are negatively correlated with productivity growth.   
The estimated coefficients of total Pillar II payments are positive, although the effect 
is not significant in NMS.   If we analyse the different components of Pillar II payments 
(Column 4), we find that in all regions there is a positive and significant effect of Pillar II 
spending on physical capital (PK).  This is the only component for which there is a positive 
effect on productivity. Hence, these PK payments seem to be cause investment-induced 
productivity gains; and the only reason why Pillar II payments stimulate productivity.   
Two other components of Pillar II payments have a negative effect in some regions, 
but not significantly for the EU-27 as a whole.  The coefficient for LFA payments is 
significant and negative in the OMS, a result that is in line with earlier empirical findings 
documenting higher efficiency losses associated with these types of payments (Lakner, 2009; 
Mary, 2013). Rural development (RD) payments have a negative and significant effect in the 
NMS. Finally, the coefficient of Environmental payments (ENV) is positive but insignificant 
for EU-27 as well as for OMS and NMS regressions. 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of agricultural labour force growth, 
population density, and the share of large farms are insignificant in the EU-27.  GDP growth, 
the grassland ratio, and ESIF spending are negatively correlated with agricultural labour 
productivity growth in the EU-27. 
The results indicate conditional β-convergence of productivity among regions.  The 
conditional β-convergence effect is captured by the estimated coefficient of the (lagged) 
agricultural VA per worker.  The coefficient is always negative and significant in most 
specifications.  Convergence is higher for the NMS (9.5% ~ 36.2%) than for the OMS (6.2% 
~ 15.1%). Within the EU-27, the speed of convergence is between 1.8% and 5.4% (Columns 
1-4 of Tables 2-4). 
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 A series of additional analyses and robustness tests are presented in Appendix.  The 
additional analyses estimate absolute convergence (Table A.1), test for σ–convergence 
(Figure A.1), test for the impact of excluded outliers (Table A.2) and of potentially 
endogenous control variables (ESIF Payments) (Table A.3).  These additional analyses show 
absolute convergence (in EU-27, OMS, and NMS), no evidence of σ–convergence26 and that 
that the overall results do not change with outliers and specific control variables.  In summary, 
the results reported above are robust to these modifications and supported by additional 
analyses.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper estimates the impact of CAP subsidies on EU agricultural labour productivity 
within a conditional growth convergence framework.  We estimate a dynamic model using the 
SYS-GMM estimator.  We use an EU-wide panel dataset covering 213 regions and the 2004–
2014 period, and CATS data with detailed information on CAP payments to farms. We use a 
SYS-GMM specification where CAP payments are treated as endogenous variables to address 
issues of potential endogeneity bias related to agricultural subsidies. 
We find that CAP subsidies, as a whole, have a positive impact on labour productivity 
in agriculture in the EU-27, OMS, and NMS. However, this aggregate positive effect hides 
important differences in the impact of different types of subsidies.   The positive effect comes 
from decoupled subsidies, i.e. Pillar I decoupled payments and Pillar II payments.  Coupled 
Pillar I subsidies have the opposite effect: they slow down productivity growth.   
                                                 
26
 Figure A.1 in Appendix shows the dispersion of agricultural productivity across the EU-27 during the period 
2004-2014. Since there is no strong downward trend in this dispersion, there is no (strong) evidence of σ–
convergence. This finding is in line with earlier studies showing that β-convergence is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for σ-convergence (Young, Higgins and Levy, 2008). 
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These findings support the argument that the CAP reforms of the past decades which 
have caused a shift from coupled subsidies to decoupled payments in Pillar I and an increase 
in Pillar II payments have been positive for agricultural labour productivity growth.  This is 
consistent with earlier findings that the shift from “coupled” to “decoupled” subsidies 
increased agricultural productivity in the EU (Rizov et al., 2013; Mary, 2013; Kazukauskas et 
al., 2014). With decoupling of support, farmers can shift to production activities with higher 
value added, and inefficiencies are likely to reduce (Dewbre et al., 2001; Guyomard et al., 
2004).   
While total Pillar II payments are positively correlated with productivity growth, this 
effect seems to be caused only by one component: Pillar II spending on physical capital (PK).  
This is the only component for which there is a positive effect on productivity. Most 
components have no effect.  LFA payments are negatively correlated with productivity in the 
OMS and rural development (RD) payments negatively correlated in the NMS.  
Our results also show conditional β-convergence of agricultural labour productivity 
among regions.  Convergence is higher for the NMS than for the OMS. 
A final caveat is that our results do not necessarily imply that decoupled payments are 
an efficient policy instrument to stimulate productivity growth in EU agriculture.  Our 
analysis only analyses the “gross effect” of the policy and ignores the costs of the policy and 
can therefore not evaluate the cost/benefit ratio and the net effect of these policies.    
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Description EU-27 OMS NMS 
  
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Total CAP payments/VA 
Subsidy rate 
1,587 0.349 1,276 0.341 311 0.380 
Pillar I payments/VA 1,587 0.265 1,276 0.276 311 0.224 
Pillar II payments/VA 1,587 0.083 1,276 0.066 311 0.156 
Pillar I coupled payments/VA 1,587 0.095 1,276 0.113 311 0.022 
Pillar I decoupled payments/VA 1,587 0.170 1,276 0.163 311 0.203 
Pillar II HK/VA 1,587 0.008 1,276 0.006 311 0.019 
Pillar II PK/VA 1,587 0.014 1,276 0.010 311 0.031 
Pillar II ENV/VA 1,587 0.026 1,276 0.024 311 0.036 
Pillar II LFA/VA 1,587 0.015 1,276 0.013 311 0.025 
Pillar II RD/VA 1,587 0.015 1,276 0.011 311 0.033 
Agricultural productivity growth Growth rate of VA-Agr. per worker 1,587 0.013 1,276 0.008 311 0.032 
Agricultural employment growth Growth rate of agricultural employment 1,587 -0.015 1,276 -0.012 311 -0.026 
Population density 1,000 person/km
2
 1,587 0.284 1,276 0.301 311 0.212 
ESIF ESIF payments/regional GDP 1,587 0.010 1,276 0.005 311 0.028 
GDP growth Annual growth rate of regional GDP 1,587 0.009 1,276 0.006 311 0.020 
Share of large farms 
Share of large farms (with a standard 
output of over 100 thousand euros) in 
total number of farms 
1,587 0.734 1,276 0.755 311 0.646 
Grassland ratio 
Share of grassland in total utilized 
agricultural area 
1,587 0.344 1,276 0.369 311 0.243 
Note: ESIF include: ERDF, CF and ESF. Sources: CATS database provided by the European Commission, CERD, DG REGIO, and Eurostat. 
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Table 2: Convergence regressions for agricultural productivity in EU-27 (213 regions) 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM OLS FE 
Total CAP subsidy rate (t-1) 0.069***    0.019 0.006 
 (4.11)    (0.86) (0.28) 
Pillar I total (t-1)  0.011     
  (0.30)     
Pillar I coupled (t-1)   -0.040*** -0.034**   
   (6.73) (2.04)   
Pillar I decoupled (t-1)   0.119*** 0.124***   
 
  (3.21) (4.87)   
Pillar II total (t-1)  0.217*** 0.252***    
  (4.23) (7.95)    
Pillar II HK (t-1)    0.289   
 
   (0.80)   
Pillar II PK (t-1)    0.384***   
 
   (3.80)   
Pillar II ENV (t-1)    0.702   
 
   (1.30)   
Pillar II LFA (t-1)    -1.027   
 
   (1.54)   
Pillar II RD (t-1)    0.211   
 
   (0.61)   
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.053*** -0.030 -0.018 -0.034** -0.026*** -0.471*** 
 
(3.33) (1.54) (1.26) (2.31) (3.61) (11.48) 
Labour force growth (t-1) 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 0.000 -0.005 
 
(0.04) (0.42) (0.73) (1.09) (0.02) (1.01) 
Population density (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.250 
 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.49) (0.60) (0.31) (0.88) 
ESIF payments (t-1) -2.397*** -2.022*** -1.744*** -2.585*** -0.953*** 0.823 
 
(3.21) (2.64) (2.82) (3.44) (2.97) (1.49) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.470** -0.484** -0.370* -0.345 -0.157 0.039 
 
(2.21) (2.33) (1.77) (1.64) (0.82) (0.22) 
Share of large farms (t-1) -0.009 -0.059 -0.082 -0.129 0.005 -0.156*** 
 
(0.19) (0.71) (1.15) (1.54) (0.18) (8.54) 
Grassland ratio (t-1) -0.054* -0.054* -0.066** -0.041 -0.035* 0.209 
 (1.77) (1.85) (2.14) (1.37) (1.69) (1.22) 
       
Speed of convergence 0.054 0.030 0.018 0.035   
R
2
 (within)     0.061 0.291 
No. of Observations 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 
No. of Instruments 190 189 199 195   
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AR(2) p-value 0.768 0.744 0.466 0.639   
Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.119 0.115 0.162 0.122   
Diff-Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.715 0.887 0.876 0.556   
Notes: OLS regression includes time fixed effects; LSDV regression includes region and time fixed effects; SYS-GMM 
regressions include time fixed effect, and CAP payments, labour force growth and ESIF payments are treated as 
endogenous. AR(n) is the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation of first (1) and second (2) order, respectively; 
Hansen test and Diff-Hansen test are tests for the over-identification restrictions for the validity of instruments. Absolute t-
statistics based on clustered standard error by region are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Convergence regressions for agricultural productivity in OMS (158 regions) 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM OLS FE 
Total CAP subsidy rate (t-1) 0.053***    0.019 0.008 
 (5.48)    (0.80) (0.34) 
Pillar I total (t-1)  0.001     
  (0.04)     
Pillar I coupled (t-1)   -0.035*** -0.030**   
   (6.29) (2.07)   
Pillar I decoupled (t-1)   0.098** 0.102***   
 
  (2.42) (3.35)   
Pillar II total (t-1)  0.200*** 0.236***    
  (5.06) (10.10)    
Pillar II HK (t-1)    0.458   
 
   (1.11)   
Pillar II PK (t-1)    0.417***   
 
   (3.65)   
Pillar II ENV (t-1)    0.319   
 
   (0.77)   
Pillar II LFA (t-1)    -1.870***   
 
   (2.97)   
Pillar II RD (t-1)    0.121   
 
   (0.36)   
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.140*** -0.095** -0.060* -0.122*** -0.025* -0.431*** 
 
(4.34) (2.37) (1.91) (3.35) (1.79) (9.26) 
Labour force growth (t-1) -0.022* -0.011 -0.018 -0.024* -0.006 -0.011* 
 
(1.87) (0.74) (1.15) (1.66) (1.05) (1.77) 
Population density (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.009 0.005 0.135 
 
(0.23) (0.37) (1.19) (1.50) (0.99) (0.44) 
ESIF payments (t-1) -4.093** -3.422** -2.122 -4.069** -1.177** -0.367 
 
(2.39) (2.03) (1.46) (2.34) (2.56) (0.43) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.469* -0.480** -0.359 -0.327 -0.106 0.013 
 
(1.90) (2.00) (1.37) (1.30) (0.49) (0.07) 
Share of large farms (t-1) 0.008 -0.052 -0.076 -0.091 -0.017 -0.162*** 
 
(0.10) (0.48) (0.86) (1.14) (0.49) (6.66) 
Grassland ratio (t-1) -0.114*** -0.102** -0.093** -0.053 -0.042** 0.201 
 
(2.68) (2.15) (2.32) (1.18) (2.08) (1.46) 
       
Speed of convergence 0.151 0.100 0.062 0.130   
R
2
 (within)     0.050 0.252 
No. of Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 
No. of Instruments 142 146 154 150   
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AR(2) p-value 0.427 0.300 0.136 0.380   
Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.110 0.151 0.185 0.119   
Diff-Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.880 0.942 0.995 0.648   
Notes: OLS regression includes time fixed effects; LSDV regression includes region and time fixed effects; SYS-GMM 
regressions include time fixed effect, and CAP payments, labour force growth and ESIF payments are treated as 
endogenous. AR(n) is the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation of first (1) and second (2) order, respectively; 
Hansen test and Diff-Hansen test are tests for the over-identification restrictions for the validity of instruments. Absolute t-
statistics based on clustered standard error by region are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Convergence regressions for agricultural productivity in NMS (55 regions)  
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM OLS FE 
Total CAP subsidy rate (t-1) 0.665**    0.043 0.035 
 (2.23)    (0.64) (0.26) 
Pillar I total (t-1)  0.232     
  (0.50)     
Pillar I coupled (t-1)   -2.887** -1.635   
   (2.06) (0.79)   
Pillar I decoupled (t-1)   1.084** 0.939**   
 
  (2.29) (2.43)   
Pillar II total (t-1)  0.940 0.286    
  (1.18) (0.66)    
Pillar II HK (t-1)    -2.266   
 
   (1.26)   
Pillar II PK (t-1)    4.016***   
 
   (4.52)   
Pillar II ENV (t-1)    0.038   
 
   (0.04)   
Pillar II LFA (t-1)    0.761   
 
   (0.37)   
Pillar II RD (t-1)    -1.231*   
 
   (1.79)   
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.304** -0.218** 0.093 -0.091 -0.021 -0.671*** 
 
(2.40) (2.06) (1.08) (1.26) (1.59) (9.70) 
Labour force growth (t-1) 0.073** 0.068** 0.070 0.061** 0.016* 0.004 
 
(2.22) (2.27) (1.55) (2.22) (1.96) (0.57) 
Population density (t-1) 0.082 0.048 -0.068* 0.022 -0.026 0.546 
 
(0.97) (0.64) (1.69) (0.51) (1.30) (1.11) 
ESIF payments (t-1) -5.243 -3.515 -3.727 -5.879** -1.018 0.178 
 
(1.62) (1.02) (1.58) (2.50) (1.22) (0.15) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.237 -0.389 -0.607 -0.616 -0.291 0.128 
 
(0.38) (0.74) (1.06) (1.03) (0.69) (0.47) 
Share of large farms (t-1) 0.483 0.354* -0.368** -0.014 0.015 0.237 
 
(1.67) (1.77) (2.11) (0.11) (0.30) (0.85) 
Grassland ratio (t-1) 0.053 0.010 0.059 0.203 0.000 0.261 
 
(0.16) (0.04) (0.38) (1.38) (0.00) (0.31) 
       
Speed of convergence 0.362 0.246 -0.089 0.095   
R
2
 (within)     0.195 0.541 
No. of Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311 
No. of Instruments 37 38 45 49   
AR(1) p-value 0.014 0.003 0.015 0.007   
AR(2) p-value 0.383 0.631 0.800 0.178   
Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.188 0.186 0.150 0.860   
Diff-Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.580 0.422 0.198 0.920   
Notes: OLS regression includes time fixed effects; LSDV regression includes region and time fixed effects; SYS-GMM 
regressions include time fixed effect, and CAP payments, labour force growth and ESIF payments are treated as 
endogenous. AR(n) is the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation of first (1) and second (2) order, respectively; 
Hansen test and Diff-Hansen test are tests for the over-identification restrictions for the validity of instruments. Absolute t-
statistics based on clustered standard error by region are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A.1: Absolute convergence in agricultural labour 
productivity across EU regions 
Dependent Variable: OLS 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker EU-27 OMS NMS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.019*** -0.015** -0.034*** 
 (4.82) (2.30) (3.28) 
    
Speed of convergence  0.019 0.015 0.035 
R
2
 0.010 0.003 0.026 
No. of Observations 1587 1276 311 
Notes: the absolute convergence is estimated by regressing the current year’s 
growth rate of the agricultural VA per worker on the level of agricultural VA per 
worker of the previous year:  𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 , denotes region i’s agricultural labour productivity growth 
between time t and t-1; 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged agricultural VA per worker, i.e. the 
convergence variable.  
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Table A.2: Robustness check with inclusion of outliers in EU-27 (213 regions) 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM OLS FE 
Total CAP subsidy rate (t-1) 0.068***    0.020 0.013 
 (4.29)    (0.93) (0.51) 
Pillar I total (t-1)  0.011     
  (0.30)     
Pillar I coupled (t-1)   -0.037*** -0.025   
   (6.08) (1.07)   
Pillar I decoupled (t-1)   0.114*** 0.118***   
 
  (2.95) (4.56)   
Pillar II total (t-1)  0.217*** 0.258***    
  (4.25) (8.75)    
Pillar II HK (t-1)    0.302   
 
   (1.03)   
Pillar II PK (t-1)    0.378***   
 
   (3.49)   
Pillar II ENV (t-1)    0.667   
 
   (1.31)   
Pillar II LFA (t-1)    -1.081*   
 
   (1.65)   
Pillar II RD (t-1)    0.159   
 
   (0.51)   
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.061*** -0.035* -0.022* -0.042*** -0.028*** -0.470*** 
 
(3.65) (1.88) (1.68) (2.99) (3.71) (11.55) 
Labour force growth (t-1) 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.37) (0.29) (0.56) (0.61) (0.14) (0.96) 
Population density (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.164 
 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.47) (0.55) (0.47) (0.57) 
ESIF payments (t-1) -2.646*** -2.215*** -1.899*** -2.647*** -0.990*** 0.727 
 
(3.44) (3.00) (3.16) (3.50) (3.04) (1.30) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.598** -0.568** -0.459* -0.512* -0.214 -0.097 
 
(2.27) (2.46) (1.96) (1.81) (1.07) (0.42) 
Share of large farms (t-1) -0.001 -0.054 -0.079 -0.110 0.006 -0.164*** 
 
(0.02) (0.63) (1.06) (1.28) (0.24) (7.55) 
Grass land ratio (t-1) -0.059* -0.058* -0.071** -0.043 -0.040* 0.184 
 (1.91) (1.92) (2.25) (1.45) (1.87) (1.04) 
       
R
2
 (within)     0.062 0.289 
No. of Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 
No. of Instruments 190 189 199 195   
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AR(2) p-value 0.662 0.686 0.407 0.520   
Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.126 0.113 0.166 0.121   
Diff-Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.765 0.895 0.900 0.742   
Notes: OLS regression includes time fixed effects; LSDV regression includes region and time fixed effects; SYS-GMM 
regressions include time fixed effect, and CAP payments, labour force growth and ESIF payments are treated as 
endogenous. AR(n) is the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation of first (1) and second (2) order, respectively; 
Hansen’s test and Diff-Hansen’s test indicate the over-identification restrictions for the validity of instruments. Absolute 
t-statistics based on clustered standard error by region in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure A.1: σ-convergence in agricultural labour productivity across EU regions 
 
Notes: The coefficient of variation is measured as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the log of agricultural 
VA per worker relative to the regional mean. 
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Table A.3: Robustness check with the exclusion of the ESIF variable in EU-27 (213 
regions) 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ log VA-Agr. per worker SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM OLS FE 
Total CAP subsidy rate (t-1) 0.068***    0.018 0.009 
 (3.88)    (0.79) (0.40) 
Pillar I total (t-1)  0.016     
  (0.38)     
Pillar I coupled (t-1)   -0.032*** -0.035**   
   (4.41) (2.33)   
Pillar I decoupled (t-1)   0.106*** 0.120***   
 
  (2.73) (4.40)   
Pillar II total (t-1)  0.224*** 0.250***    
  (4.77) (8.12)    
Pillar II HK (t-1)    0.393   
 
   (1.14)   
Pillar II PK (t-1)    0.293**   
 
   (2.11)   
Pillar II ENV (t-1)    0.534   
 
   (1.14)   
Pillar II LFA (t-1)    -1.257**   
 
   (2.13)   
Pillar II RD (t-1)    0.181   
 
   (0.56)   
VA-Agr. per worker (t-1) -0.029*** -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.018*** -0.469*** 
 
(2.65) (0.65) (0.20) (0.56) (2.85) (11.23) 
Labour force growth (t-1) 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 
 
(0.16) (0.41) (0.33) (0.35) (0.07) (1.04) 
Population density (t-1) 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.156 
 
(0.66) (0.68) (1.26) (0.13) (0.70) (0.59) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.406* -0.503** -0.407* -0.246 -0.121 0.040 
 
(1.89) (2.45) (1.92) (1.12) (0.63) (0.23) 
Share of large farms (t-1) -0.011 -0.066 -0.086 -0.126* 0.006 -0.159*** 
 
(0.25) (0.86) (1.28) (1.67) (0.22) (8.77) 
Grassland ratio (t-1) -0.042 -0.048** -0.059** -0.013 -0.030 0.225 
 
(1.55) (1.98) (2.10) (0.53) (1.42) (1.34) 
       
R
2
 (within)     0.057 0.290 
No. of Observations 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 
No. of Instruments 146 188 199 206   
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
AR(2) p-value 0.857 0.824 0.479 0.710   
Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.003 0.105 0.162 0.133   
Diff-Hansen J-Stat. p-value 0.191 0.977 0.984 0.760   
Notes: OLS regression includes time fixed effects; LSDV regression includes region and time fixed effects; SYS-GMM 
regressions include time fixed effect and CAP payments and labour force growth are treated as endogenous. AR(n) is 
the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation of first (1) and second (2) order, respectively; Hansen test and Diff-
Hansen test indicate the over-identification restrictions for the validity of instruments. Absolute t-statistics based on 
clustered standard error by region in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
